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The final phrases of Comment C'est' negate the novel's elaborate structure 
and affirm only the narrator and his most intimate environment. The narrator 
rejects one by one the hypotheses of existence to which he has previously 
devoted his energy and resourcefulness (pp. 173-177) and reduces his universe 
to five irrefutable constants: himself, his voice, the panting, the mud, and the 
darkness. The ultimate negation absorbs even the novel's tripartite construction: 
the notions before Pirn, with Pirn, and after Pirn, lose all significance following 
the assertion of the final sequence, "jamais eu de Pim" (p. 175). Pirn, like the 
sack, the scenes of life above, the scribes, the voice "quaqua" and the notions of 
order and justice, is a fictional existence which the narrative entertains and 
eventually dismisses. 
From the very first page of the novel, the narrator speaks of a sack, a quite 
ordinary sack, "un petit à charbon cinquante kilos jute humide" (p. 10). The sack 
contains food: tins of moldy tuna fish, sardines, shrimp, and sprats; but it is 
more than a source of nourishment. Strangely comforting and appealing, it 
invites the narrator to crawl inside (p. 13). In a vision of life above, he is born 
from the sack (p. 108). It becomes in another scene a cherished mistress (p. 21). 
A possession to which he can assign the adjective "mon" (p. 21), the sack helps to 
extend his existence. Reluctant to release this extension of himself, the narrator 
considers with anguish the necessity to free both hands during meals: "le sac ma 
vie que jamais je ne lâche ici je le lâche besoin des deux mains . . ." (p. 42) 
and ". . . j e lâche donc le sac mais minute il est ma vie je me couche donc 
dessus ça s'enchaîne toujours" (p. 43). 
Questions raised by the sack lead the narrator to a confrontation with the 
fundamental mysteries of his existence. His intial encounter with Pim leaves him 
with a bewildered impression of injustice: Pim has a full sack whereas his has 
burst and been lost. The apparently unequal distribution of the sacks arouses 
confused feelings of resentment which later, when he again has a sack, yield to a 
desire to understand and to plot the possibly cyclical nature of the sack's 
possession: 
. . . ça ne va pas quelque chose là qui ne va pas 
le sac c'est le sac Pim est parti sans sac il m'a laissé son sac j 'ai donc laissé 
mon sac à Bern je laisserai mon sac à Bom je quitterai Bom sans sac j 'ai 
quitté Bern sans sac pour aller vers Pim . . . 
ce sac donc que je n'avais pas en quittant Bern et que j'avais en allant vers 
Pim . . . je l'avais donc trouvé de la raison il m'en reste ce sac sans quoi 
pas de voyage 
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parti donc sans sac j'avais un sac je l'avais donc trouvé sur mon chemin 
voilà la difficulté aplanie nous laissons nos sacs à ceux qui n'en ont pas 
besoin nous prenons leurs sacs à ceux qui vont en avoir besoin nous 
partons sans sac nous en trouvons un nous pouvons voyager (p. 135) 
With a certain perplexity, the narrator confronts the astonishing inefficiency 
of his universe which, although strictly regulated, consumes unproductively vast 
quantities of sacks. Aware finally of the controlled cyclical rhythm of his life, the 
narrator perceives the paradoxical absurdity of its regulated order: ". . . nous 
laissons nos sacs à ceux qui n'en ont pas besoin nous prenons leurs sacs à ceux 
qui vont en avoir besoin . . ." (p. 135). Life in the mud is consistent but not 
harmonie. 
Having formulated the order which governs the distribution of the sacks, 
the narrator pursues the source of that order. Reviving for this purpose the 
religion of his childhood, he hypothesizes a supreme being, "celui qui fournit les 
sacs" (p. 150), a creature sensitive to the injustice of any deviation in the order 
which he has established (p. 150). With intelligence and love he provides the 
sacks: ". . . afin que nous soyons possibles nos accouplements voyages et 
abandons besoin de quelqu'un pas des nôtres une intelligence quelque part un 
amour qui tout le long de la piste aux bons endroits au fur et à mesure de nos 
besoins dépose nos sacs" (p. 166). 
The supreme being who with love provides that every creature shall have a 
sack also furnishes to each creature a partner who will be alternately his 
tormentor or his victim. The narrator's insistence on the happiness experienced 
with Pirn overshadows the obvious cruelty of the couple relationship. The 
violence of the narrator's system of communication and the free use he makes of 
the verb "torment" create an impression of sordid brutality. But this is the 
negative face of a relationship which is basically affirmative: "période heureuse à 
sa façon . . . la deuxième partie avec Pim comment c'était de bons moments 
bons pour moi on parle de moi pour lui aussi on parle de lui aussi heureux aussi 
à sa façon je le saurai plus tard je saurai de quelle façon son bonheur je l'aurai 
je n'ai pas encore tout eu" (p. 63). 
The phrase "à sa façon" attenuates to some degree this notion of happiness; 
but in the midst of a solitary, painful journey through the mud, the anticipated 
encounter with a mate extends an appealing force. We can judge the strength of 
the appeal by the obsessional allusions in part one to the future life with Pim as 
well as by the sensation of pleasure provoked here by the distant promise of one 
day becoming a victim. 
The couple experience offers more than this happiness. For the primary 
function of the association with Pim is the communication of scenes from life 
above. Through the evocative power of Pirn's voice, the narrator experiences 
visions of life which he assimilates and makes his own. The scenes present visions 
of a life shared by Pim, the narrator, and countless other creatures of the mud: 
"cette vie donc qu'il aurait eue inventée remémorée un peu de chaque comment 
savoir cette chose là-haut il me la donnait je la faisais mienne . . ." (p. 89), 
and also ". . . q u ' u n e seule vie là-haut d 'âge en âge jamais qu ' une 
seule . . ." (pp. 89-90). 
The visions juxtapose nostalgie lyricism with a depressing grotesqueness. 
The narrator's expressed skepticism casts a shadow over some of the more 
appealing images (see p. 87, for example). The scenes pursue at some length a 
romantic adventure which had begun to unfold in part one with an outing in the 
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country, a young boy and girl holding hands and feeding sandwiches to one 
another. In part two, Pirn and the narrator share the tragic conclusion of the 
adventure with Pam Prim: her fall or jump from a window (p. 94). The scenes 
portray in touching terms the continuation of this episode, a reconciliation in 
Pam's hospital room and a vain daily search for flowers. The story concludes 
with a general confession of aimlessness and failure: "ma vie là-haut ce que je 
faisais dans ma vie là-haut un peu de tout tout essayé puis renoncé ça allait la 
même chose toujours un trou une ruine toujours à manger jamais doué pour 
rien pas fait pour cette chinoiserie errer dans les coins et dormir tout ce que je 
voulais . . ." (p. 96). 
The young lover's impotence, his powerlessness at the moment of Pam's 
death, his inability to find flowers for her, tear from him the confession that life 
above, no less than life below, has been a series of frustrating failures. The 
adventure with Pirn furnishes two parallel commentaries on the failure of human 
intercourse: Pirn and the narrator envision the tragic denouement of the Pam 
Prim story which echoes their own failure to know and to love one another (see 
pp. 148-149); life in the mud is not a hell from which Pirn and the narrator 
recreate visions of a lost earthly paradise, for these visions of life in the light are 
either uncertain, grotesque, or tragic. They do not contrast favorably with life in 
the mud and do not represent a dream of eventual escape; when the narrator 
fashions his ultimate escape, it will not be an escape upward into the light. 
In order to put an end to his wearisome life in the mud, the narrator must 
first understand the nature of the forces which limit his freedom. He gradually 
perceives that in addition to the physical incapacity which condemns him to 
crawl in the mud, there are even more serious restraints which shackle his 
imagination. In order to begin to shape his own destiny, he must first seize 
control of his own narration from the external authors who dictate and 
transcribe his existence. 
Kram and Krim, witness and scribe respectively, observe and record the 
narrator's life. Vaguely aware of them from the beginning: ". . . quelqu'un 
qui écoute un autre qui note ou le même" (p. 10), the narrator gradually 
elaborates their existence: "il vit penché sur moi voilà la vie qu'on lui a donnée 
toute ma surface visible plongée dans la lumière de ses lampes quand je m'en 
vais il me suit courbé en deux il a un aide assis un peu à l'écart il lui annonce 
brefs mouvements du bas du visage l'aide l'inscrit dans son registre" (p. 22). 
But Kram is an inaccurate witness. Bored by long periods of inactivity, he 
occasionally reports more than he actually observes (p. 100). In addition, he is a 
poetic dreamer who allows himself forbidden distractions: "petit calepin à part 
ces notes intimes petit calepin à moi effusions de l'âme . . ." (p. 103). As a 
result of his distractions, Kram often misses parts of the narration (p. 99). In 
short, he neglects and corrupts his assigned task and thereby limits the accuracy 
of Krim's transcriptions. The creature in the mud, supposedly the narrator of 
his own life, is actually at the mercy of the eccentric witness who may omit or 
distort essential features of his adventure. 
There exists, however, an even more serious and more fundamental 
distortion of the narrative, a distortion which begins even before the creature 
painfully murmurs his words into the mud. For it is quite clear that the words 
uttered by his panting breath are not based upon his own personal experience in 
the mud. 
From the very first paragraph of the text, the narrator reveals that he is 
neither remembering nor inventing; he is quoting another source: "comment 
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c'était je cite avant Pim avec Pim après Pim . . . je le dis comme je l'entends" 
(p. 9). The English text eliminates the ambiguity of the verb entendre: "I say it as 
I hear it."2 The narrator clarifies that what he hears is a voice, a voice which has 
become his unique source of information: "d'elle que je tiens tout comment 
c'était . . . comment c'est . . . comment ce sera des mots pour ça bref ma 
vie . . ." (p. 153). His whole life is no more than the narration of life which 
the voice furnishes. He does nothing more than to recapitulate approximately 
what he hears, to edit, as best he can, the narration of a life. At the same time, 
however, he lives. Tension gradually develops between his real life in the mud 
and the inaccurate narrated life imposed upon him; several times in the course 
of the narrative this tension provokes brief revolts. The creature repeatedly 
rejects certain words, phrases, and ideas forced upon him which do not coincide 
with his perception of life. This rejection takes the form of the often repeated 
phrase, "quelque chose là qui ne va pas." 
What is the voice and where does it come from? The narrator provides 
some basic information and adds to it his own hypotheses concerning the nature 
of the voice. He imagines that the voice is the product of a sort of collective 
consciousness: "quaqua notre voix à tous quels tous tous ceux ici avant moi et à 
venir solitaires dans cette souille ou collés les uns aux autres tous les Pim 
bourreaux promus victimes passées si jamais ça passe et future ça c'est sûr plus 
que n'en défit jamais la terre sa lumière ces tous-là" (p. 131). 
The voice of the brotherhood of creatures in the mud, victims and 
tormentors, past, present, and future, all dictating a single life which it is one 
creature's lot to narrate: the image is appealing but not conclusive, for the 
narrator continues to explore the nature of the voice through a series of 
grotesque hypotheses involving loudspeakers and recordings (p. 130). In a 
display of apparent independence from the voice, the narrator explores a 
specific error committed by it and attempts to discover the cause of the 
inaccuracy. This rejection of the voice's authority is more substantial than the 
intuitive, "quelque chose là qui ne va pas," and more imposing than the 
occasional emotional outburst in which the narrator desperately denies the voice 
(see pp. 91 or 106). Yet it seems that the voice itself dictates all of these denials 
of its own existence and authority (see p. 138) and that the creature's apparent 
revolts are no more than submissive responses to the voice's dictation. 
The narrator's vain efforts to gain control of his own existence lead to 
further affirmation of his lack of control. He sadly acknowledges that the 
narration of his life is hopelessly false and remote: "ma vie une voix dehors 
quaqua de toutes parts des mots des bribes puis rien puis d'autres . . . bribes 
les mêmes mal dites mal entendues puis rien un temps énorme puis en moi dans 
le caveau blancheur d'os des bribes dix secondes quinze secondes mal entendues 
mal murmurées mal entendues mal notées ma vie entière balbutiement six fois 
écorché" (pp. 161-162). Despite its inaccuracy, the voice and the subsequent 
narration constitute, for the narrator, life, the only life he is allowed. 
In the course of his interrogation of the nature of the system in which he is 
imbedded, the narrator evokes on several occasions an order which governs the 
procession of tormentors and victims. He speaks in terms of a regulated order 
(p. 135), a mathematical justice (p. 136), and eventually, as we have seen, 
hypothesizes a supreme being, "celui qui fournit les sacs" (p. 150). The 
formulation of this being ultimately permits the narrator to eliminate Kram and 
Krim and to give to his narration a more reassuring destiny: "ou pas de Kram ça 
aussi . . . une oreille quelque part là-haut et jusqu'à elle le murmure qui 
s'élève . . . là où il y a une oreille un esprit pour comprendre la possibilité 
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de noter le souci de nous le désir de noter la curiosité de comprendre . . ." 
(p. 162). The existence of such an ear is obviously a comforting possibility; it 
gives to the procession in the mud and to the narration of that procession a 
semblance of meaning. It places the creature under the protection of a doubly 
benevolent being who provides sacks for his well-being and who notes with great 
concern his murmur. Further reflection, however, upon this being and upon the 
nature of his universe leads to the supposition of an even more devastating 
futility; for the ear which listens and the voice which dictates must belong to the 
same deity: "le voilà donc ce pas des nôtres . . . qui s'écoute soi-même et en 
prêtant l'oreille à notre murmure ne fait que la prêter à une histoire de son cru 
mal inspirée mal dite et chaque fois si ancienne si oubliée que peut lui paraître 
conforme celle qu'à la boue nous lui murmurons" (p. 167). 
The narrator's investigations, pushed one step beyond the promise of order, 
meaning, or salvation, unfailingly uncover chaos, absurdity, and denial: the 
regularity of the distribution of the sacks barely conceals the ludicrous ineffi-
ciency of that distribution; the tenuous possibility of love between two creatures 
fades before the certain lack of mutual knowledge; and finally, the redemptive, 
benevolent being who listens and notes does both badly thus perpetuating a false 
narration. 
The possibility of change, that is of an end to his life in the mud, fascinates 
the narrator from the beginning of his narration. In the third part of the 
narrative the creature formulates a supreme being from whom he might seek 
deliverance. But the unresponsiveness of that being does not permit the hope 
that his care and concern might eventually bring about an end to the eternal 
crawling through the mud. Given, however, the nature of existence and the 
senseless function of the supreme being which is to perpetuate that senselessness, 
the narrator asks quite justifiably if he too might be anxious to put an end to it 
all: "celui qui ma foi je cite toujours doit parfois se demander si à ces 
perpétuelles fournitures communications écoutes et rédactions il ne saurait 
mettre un terme . . ." (p. 168). Certain finally that the voice too is eager to 
end definitively the narration ("ce pas des nôtres ressasseur fou lui aussi de 
lassitude" p. 173), the narrator quickly abandons several moderate formulations 
of change in favor of a more radical solution: ". . . je cite toujours une 
solution plus simple de beaucoup et plus radicale" (p. 173). 
With the obvious complicity of the voice ("je cite toujours"), the narrator 
begins to ask a series of questions which he himself will answer in order to 
negate those elements of his universe which bind him to the mud (pp. 173-174). 
He begins by affirming that all the explanations and calculations he has made 
from the beginning to the end are completely false, that the voice "quaqua" does 
not exist, that his is the only voice: "il s'est passé quelque chose oui mais rien de 
tout ça non de la foutaise d'un bout à l'autre oui . . . qu'une voix ici oui la 
mienne oui . . ." (p. 174). In subsequent phrases he affirms only the panting, 
the mud, the darkness, and his murmur, and denies all other external factors. 
A crucial stage in his new formulation of existence is the affirmation that 
the panting increases while his voice diminishes: ". . . haletant oui de plus en 
plus fort pas de réponse DE PLUS EN PLUS FORT oui . . ." (p. 176), and 
again, two paragraphs later: ". . . quelques mots oui quelques bribes oui que 
personne n'entend oui mais de moins en moins pas de réponse DE MOINS EN 
MOINS oui" (pp. 176-177). The decline of the narrator's vitality—to which he 
has previously alluded (p. 125)—introduces conclusive evidence of a possible 
modification of his situation. He greets enthusiastically this possibility, "alors ça 
peut changer" (p. 177), and anxiously explores its consequences: "alors ça peut 
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changer pas de réponse finir pas de réponse je pourrais suffoquer pas de 
réponse m'engloutir pas de réponse plus souiller la boue pas de réponse le noir 
pas de réponse plus troubler le silence pas de réponse . . . CREVER 
hurlements JE POURRAIS CREVER hurlements JE VAIS CREVER hurlements 
bon" (p. 177). The responsive screams to the postulation of an eventual death 
express the violence of self-destruction. But the adjective "bon" greets the 
creature's ultimate release as the narrative comes to a close, "bon bon fin de la 
troisième partie et dernière voilà comment c'était fin de la citation après Pim 
comment c'est" (p. 177). 
Within the four words "fin de la citation" resides the ultimate irony of the 
creature's death. He is not independent and responsible for he has merely 
quoted a denouement dictated to him by the voice and has given an illusion of 
independence which his final phrases shatter. They reaffirm his inescapable 
dependence and leave the reader with the knowledge that the real drama is not 
the creature's, but is rather the drama of the dictating voice, of the original 
creator who uses the creature in the mud as a pawn so that he may escape from 
his endless narration. The novel's conclusion is a sort of double suicide, brought 
about by a single lucid consciousness. 
To try to find meaning in the narrator's adventure is a vain task. Despite his 
analytical and philosophical pretensions, the novel is neither analytical nor 
philosophical. It is a purely descriptive vision of "how it is." Beckett has his 
creature in the mud present interminable hypotheses of existence, not as a 
consistent philosophical argument, but rather as a demonstration of the working 
of a mind in a universe which may or may not be related to ours. The novel 
explores a vision of life in the Beckettian universe, complete with many of the 
familiar motifs of that universe, namely absurdity, physical and mental deca-
dence, solitude, sadism, a desire to die, an inability to communicate, a need to 
communicate, and through all the frustrations of this existence a certain 
contentment with life, a satisfaction with life's small pleasures, such as moldy 
food, a comforting sack, and a partner. 
If at the end of the novel a creature escapes, breaking the bonds of his 
muddy universe and finding freedom in deauS, it is not because he has outwitted 
the voice which dictates his universe, but rather because the voice itself has 
willed the contrived escape. The creature's reasoning, his analyses, his postula-
tions, all come to nothing; they cancel one another out. Each successive 
hypothesis negates a preceding conclusion or exists simultaneously with its 
contrary. Reason, logic, philosophy, theology, and mathematics fail to find order 
and a way out. The muddy universe encourages these activities which lead to 
nothing except perhaps to an illusion of order which makes life bearable. Reason 
entertains him, keeps him from perceiving accurately his own misery, keeps him 
alive, until the voice, defying logic ("aussi invraisemblable que cela puisse 
paraître" p. 174), dictates the creature's death. As he dies, he annihilates along 
with himself his false formulations, and nothing remains in his wake. 
NOTES 
'Samuel Beckett, Comment C'est (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1961). AU subsequent references are to 
this edition. 
!Samuel Beckett, How It is (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 7. 
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